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California's "Unique" Approach to
Arbitration: Why This Road Less
Traveled Will Make All the Difference
on the Issue of Preemption Under the
Federal Arbitration Act
Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an oft-quoted axiom that in 1925 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA)' to "reverse centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
by placing them on equal footing with other contracts." 2 Recent decisions in Cali-
fomia state courts and the Ninth Circuit, however, show that the same judicial
hostility ostensibly thwarted eighty years ago continues today, albeit in a more
subtle-but equally hostile-form.
Indeed, the state of arbitration law is at a pivotal crossroads. This article
traces how, despite the laudable goals of the FAA, "judicial hostility" to arbitra-
tion has reared its unwelcome head once again. Today, courts in California trans-
late their judicial hostility into seemingly innocuous pronouncements of "uncon-
scionability" and "unwaivable statutory protections." We also explain why, at the
end of the day, this brief judicial foray by the lower courts should be held pre-
empted by the FAA.
We begin this article by framing the issue in simple terms. The statute itself
is clear. The FAA contains a "savings clause" that provides that arbitration
agreements shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.",3 By its terms, the
FAA permits courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements if the agreement is
* Michael G. McGuinness and Adam J. Karr are attorneys in the Los Angeles office of O'Melveny
& Myers LLP. McGuinness and Karr specialize in labor and employment matters. The authors would
like to thank Crystal Silva for her significant assistance in preparing this article. The authors are also
indebted to Scott Dunham, Adam KohSweeney, Kristin Feitelson, and Christin Cho for their invalu-
able editing and research work.
1. Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2004)).
2. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995). See also H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924). The report, outlin-
ing the historical perspective, states as follows:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some centuries ago, be-
cause of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce spe-
cific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their juris-
diction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in
the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.
Id.
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
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invalid under state laws that "arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revo-
cability, and enforceability of contracts generally." 4
In essence, arbitration agreements must be treated like all other contracts-no
better, no worse. To this end, courts are empowered by the FAA to apply gener-
ally applicable contract defenses, like unconscionability and fraud, in assessing
the validity of agreements to arbitrate. But state laws-whether of legislative or
judicial origin-that are uniquely hostile to arbitration are preempted by the FAA.
Courts are required "to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like
other contracts, in accordance with their terms."5
To use an old clichd, "this is where the trouble came from." Beginning with
the California Supreme Court's seminal decision in Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (and perhaps before),6 California courts-and the
Ninth Circuit-have taken the FAA's "savings clause" where no court has gone
before. With only a few exceptions, arbitration agreements that have been evalu-
ated under California's post-Armendariz law have been held invalid under the
"generally applicable contract defense" of unconscionability. The FAA's savings
clause, which was enacted with the aim of placing arbitration agreements "on
equal footing with other contracts," is now used as the platform to strike them
down in legion.
The FAA permits courts to apply general contract principles-like uncon-
scionability-to arbitration agreements and this is, for the most part, just what
California courts and the Ninth Circuit claim to be doing. In fact, they are not. It
is a ruse that has the transparent appeal of compliance with the FAA, but merely
cloaks the ever expanding judicial hostility that permeates the courts' decisions in
the arbitration context. Indeed, California has created a new brand of unconscion-
ability. It is far more demanding-and it is unique to arbitration. It is this brand
of unconscionability that is preempted by the FAA.
In this article, we seek to prove this point, which we readily admit, to date,
has fallen on deaf ears before the courts. To prove our point, we delve into the
subtleties of the FAA, the unconscionability doctrine (then and now), and several
recent cases on the topic. Specifically, in Section II of this article we provide
some background on the FAA, its enactment, and the case law dealing with FAA
preemption. In Section I, we address unconscionability-as a general contract
theory-and its original doctrinal formulation. In Section IV, we put all of this
together and provide a few examples that illustrate why California's-and the
Ninth Circuit's-application of unconscionability in an arbitration setting, despite
the courts' statements to the contrary, is "unique and hostile to arbitration" and,
thus, preempted by the FAA. Section V paints with a broader brush and deals
with the California-and Ninth Circuit-decisions related to arbitration with a
focus on the courts' application of unconscionability doctrine and its transparent
hostility to arbitration.
4. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,492 n.9 (1987).
5. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
6. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
[Vol. I
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II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. History and Structure of the Federal Arbitration Act
We begin with some historical flare and a brief description of the structure of
the FAA. Prior to the enactment of the FAA, courts-in an almost uniform
voice-refused to enforce private arbitration agreements. 7 "American courts in
general demonstrated hostility toward ordering specific performance of an agree-
ment to arbitrate, seemingly adopting a jealous notion ... that arbitration agree-
ments were nothing less than a drain on their own authority to settle disputes."8
The judiciary's refusal to enforce these agreements thwarted the interests of com-
mercial enterprises that relied upon the efficiency and institutional knowledge of
the arbitral forum to resolve their disputes. 9 Over time, business interests began to
exert pressure on state legislatures to invalidate the common law rules that denied
specific performance of arbitration agreements.' 0 These efforts swelled during the
early twentieth century when the business community and the legal profession
jointly lobbied state governments and Congress for legislation compelling courts
to enforce arbitration agreements." During this same time, the American Bar
Association's Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law went to
work on the original draft of the FAA, which was ultimately submitted to Con-
gress. 12 In 1925, both houses of Congress passed the FAA and it was signed into
7. Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's
Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 389 (1992). See also Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87
U.S. 445, 458 (1874) (refusing to enforce an agreement to arbitrate found in an insurance contract);
Red Cross Line v. At. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1924); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995) (explaining the historical prejudice against arbitration agreements); Rowe
v. Williams, 97 Mass. 163, 165 (Mass. 1867). Because courts would not enforce agreements to arbi-
trate, arbitration was practicable only in settings where non-legal sanctions, such as reprisals by other
actors within the market, obliged parties to abide by their arbitration agreements. Christopher R.
Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 701 (2001) [hereinafter Drahozal,
Unfair]. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924); 3 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1719 (1920) (explaining the hostility and quoting Lord Camp-
bell in Scott v. Avery, 4 H.L. Cas. 811, "It has been asserted and never denied that this hostility proba-
bly originated 'in the contests of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdiction-all of them
being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of jurisdiction"').
8. Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 853 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 n.6 (1985)).
9. The business community found that arbitration provided a more efficient forum for resolving
commercial disputes. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforce-
ment Of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449, 460 (1996).
10. Id. at 465. In 1920, the New York state legislature led this movement by passing a statute that
revoked that state's common law rule denying specific performance of agreements to arbitrate. 1920
N.Y. Laws 275. New Jersey followed in short order, enacting a similar statute three years later. 1923
N.J. Laws 134.
11. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1380 (1991);
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 125-26 (2002) [hereinafter Drahozal, In Defense of
Southland]. See generally Cole, supra note 9, at 461.
12. Cole, supra note 9, at 466. The FAA was actually modeled on the arbitration statute enacted by
the New York state legislature. Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federaliza-
tion of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1312 (1985). Julius Henry Cohen, general counsel for
the New York Chamber of Commerce and a member of the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade &
2005]
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law by President Calvin Coolidge. 13 The stated purpose of the FAA was to re-
verse the pervasive and longstanding judicial hostility towards arbitration.14
The central paradigm of the FAA is that courts are to assess the enforceability
of arbitration provisions as they would any other contract provision. This princi-
ple is embodied in section 2 of the FAA, which provides that, while arbitration
provisions in agreements involving "maritime" or "commerce" are valid, courts
may declare them unenforceable on the same grounds as they would any other
contract provision.15 Section 2 of the FAA states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, trans-
action, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.
16
In short, the FAA places arbitration agreements on equal footing with other
contracts. It binds courts either to enforce an arbitration agreement or refuse to
enforce it in accord with traditional contract defenses. 17 What courts cannot do is
single out arbitration agreements and refuse to enforce them under special rules
applicable only to arbitration agreements.' 8 At the time of the FAA's enactment,
many believed it applied only in federal courts,' 9 but the United States Supreme
Commercial Law, authored the first draft of the FAA. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland, supra note
11, at 130. For a thorough discussion of the historical rules related to arbitration, up to and including
the FAA, see Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928).
13. Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1926). Cohen and Dayton wrote, "By this Act
there is reversed a hoary doctrine that agreements for arbitration are revocable at will and are unen-
forceable .... This statute is not an isolated change of an outworn rule of law. It is a single step in a
movement of growing momentum. The movement finds its origin in the unfortunate congestion of the
courts and in delay, expense and technicality of litigation."
14. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995); Anne Brafford, Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion, 21 J. CORP. L. 331, 334 (1996). In 1927, California
enacted the California Arbitration Act (CAA). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2004).
The CAA requires arbitration when a written agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. See id.
§ 1281.1. The CAA embodies, for the most part, identical substantive terms and a public policy simi-
lar to the FAA. See, e.g., Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 709 P.2d 826, 833 (Cal. 1985).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Em-
ployment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735 (2001).
18. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)
(citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
19. Traci L. Jones, State Law of Contract Formation in the Shadow of the Federal Arbitration Act,
46 DUKE L.J. 651, 656 (1996). One month after Congress passed the FAA, the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee that drafted the Act wrote:
The statute establishes a procedure in the [flederal courts for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.... A [flederal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration agreements does
relate solely to procedure in the [flederal courts .... [W]hether or not an arbitration agreement
is to be enforced is a question of the law of procedure and is determined by the law of the juris-
diction wherein the remedy is sought. That the enforcement of arbitration agreements is within
[Vol. I
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Court, in cases discussed fully below, clarified that both state and federal courts
are bound by the FAA.2°
The FAA also establishes the mechanisms necessary to empower courts to en-
force arbitration agreements. It authorizes courts, pursuant to a party's petition, to
order the parties to proceed with arbitration in accord with the terms of the agree-
ment and to stay judicial proceedings until arbitration is concluded. 2' The FAA
does not, however, create an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. 22 Instead,
parties must rely on traditional bases of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity ju-
risdiction or federal question jurisdiction, in order for federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction.23
B. Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act:
The Force of Preemption
The FAA was enacted as remedial legislation intended to thwart judicial hos-
tility to arbitration and force courts to assess the enforceability of arbitration
agreements just as they do all other contractual provisions.24 The United States
Supreme Court has, over time, defined the contours of the FAA to vigorously
effectuate this aim. The Court has relied on the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution to conclude that the FAA established "a body of federal sub-
stantive law of arbitrability. ' '25 The Court has broadly interpreted the FAA provi-
sions that direct courts to enforce arbitration agreements, while narrowly constru-
ing those provisions that limit the reach of the FAA. Because the scope of the
the law of procedure as distinguished from substantive law is well settled by the decisions of our
courts.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 26 (1984) (alterations in original) (quoting Committee on
Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, II
A.B.A. J. 153, 154-55 (1925)).
20. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1983) (challenging conventional wisdom and hold-
ing that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases). The Erie decision provided
that federal courts lacked the authority to create substantive law, thereby bringing the question of
whether the FAA was a purely procedural statute or substantive law that applied in both federal and
state courts to the fore. Id. If the FAA were passed as substantive law pursuant to the grant of author-
ity in Article 1II, its validity was uncertain because the thrust of the Erie decision resolved that Con-
gress exceeded its authority if it provided federal rules of decision for state-created rights in diversity
cases. Hirshman, supra note 12, at 1317-18. On the other hand, if Congress enacted the FAA pursuant
to its authority to regulate interstate commerce, then the FAA was federal substantive law not subject
to the Erie doctrine. Id.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2004). This is one of the primary distinctions between the FAA and many of its
state counterparts, including the CAA, which permit courts to allow judicial proceedings to proceed
first or concurrently under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Mount Diablo Med. Ctr. v. Health Net of
Cal., Inc., 101 Cal. App. 4th 711, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (interpreting CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
1281.2(c) to authorize California courts to refuse to enforce a contractual arbitration provision if arbi-
tration threatens to produce a result that may conflict with the outcome of related litigation not subject
to arbitration).
22. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). The court
stated, "The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It
creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to
arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction ......
23. Id.
24. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987).
25. Moses H., 460 U.S. at 24. The FAA does not incorporate an express preemption clause. Braf-
ford, supra note 14, at 336.
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FAA-and its application to California's courts-is contingent on this precedent,
below we review the leading Supreme Court decisions defining the jurisdictional
breadth and preemptive scope of the FAA.
The Supreme Court has, as an initial matter, resolved that the threshold ques-
tion of whether claims are arbitrable must be decided with a "healthy regard for
,26the federal policy favoring arbitration." Consequently, when the parties include
claims within the ambit of their arbitration agreement, the FAA ensures that the
agreement will be enforced even if a state statute or a state common law rule
would otherwise operate to exclude it from arbitration.27 While the core purpose
of the FAA is to ensure arbitration provisions are interpreted and enforced accord-
ing to their terms, 28 ambiguities regarding the scope of the arbitration clause must
be resolved in favor of arbitration. 29 Similarly, state law principles governing
contract interpretation must be applied with a due regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration.3 °
The Supreme Court embarked on the task of defining the scope of the FAA in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.3' The primary issue in
Prima Paint was whether a claim of fraud in the inducement related to a contract
that contained an arbitration clause was properly adjudicated in the courts or arbi-
32tration. For purposes of this article, far more important than this issue, the Court
also used Prima Paint to rule on the then unsettled question of whether the Court
could apply the FAA to disputes where jurisdiction was based solely on diversity
of citizenship.33 The Court held it could, declaring that "it [was] clear beyond
dispute" that Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its authority to legislate re-
garding interstate commerce and admiralty, and therefore, the Act established a
body of substantive federal law applicable to all cases involving interstate com-
merce. 34 The FAA, therefore, authorized federal courts to determine whether an
arbitration clause in a contract is valid and enforceable. In accord with the man-
date of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,35 however, the Prima Paint court also
acknowledged that federal courts addressing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements were bound to apply state substantive contract law in making their
assessment.
36
The Prima Paint decision resolved that federal courts sitting in diversity ju-
risdiction are bound by the FAA, but it did not address whether state courts were
26. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
27. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995).
28. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 469 (1989).
29. Id. at 476.
30. Id. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 37 (1991).
31. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
32. Id. at 396-97. The party resisting arbitration alleged that Flood & Conklin fraudulently induced
the contract by advancing false representations of its financial strength only a week before it filed for
bankruptcy. Id. at 398. The Court held that a defense to enforcement of an arbitration provision may
only be adjudicated in a judicial forum when the defense is directed at the arbitration provision itself,
rather than the contract as a whole. Id. at 404. In other words, the court must sever the arbitration
provision from the contract and assess its enforceability separately.
33. Id. at 404. In light of Erie, federal courts were bound to follow state rules of decision in substan-
tive matters or when application of the rule is "outcome determinative." Id. at 404-05.
34. Id. at 405.
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
36. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05.
[Vol. I
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also obligated to abide by the FAA's terms. Approximately twenty years later,
however, the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp. provided the first indication that the FAA did, in fact, govern
in state courts. 37 As the Court considered whether it was proper for a federal dis-
trict court to stay an arbitration compelled pursuant to the FAA on the grounds
that a parallel action was taking place in state court, the Court also took the oppor-
tunity to pronounce that the FAA "governs [the issue of arbitrability] in either
state or federal court"38 because the Act embodies a "liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements" 3 9 and established "a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability., 40 The Court pointed out that it would be absurd for Congress to
enact a law that requires enforcement of arbitration agreements against a party
who files suit in federal court, but not against one who files an identical suit in
state court.4' This is particularly true in light of the fact that the FAA broadly
mandated enforcement of arbitration agreements.42
Although the language in Moses H. strongly suggested that the Supreme
Court was prepared to apply the dictates of the FAA to state courts, this issue was
not expressly resolved until the Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating.4 3
In Keating, franchisees filed suit against their franchisor for violation of the Cali-
fornia Franchise Investment Law and other common law claims."4 The franchisor
petitioned for an order compelling arbitration based on an arbitration provision
contained in the franchise agreement. 45 This dispute made its way to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, which held that by statutory directive claims under the Cali-
fornia Franchise Investment Law could only be adjudicated in a judicial forum,
not in arbitration.46 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether this
holding, which barred specific types of claims from arbitration, violated the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.47
In considering this question, the Supreme Court first noted that the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute directly conflicted with the FAA's
commands. 48 The Supreme Court reasoned that by declaring a "national policy
favoring arbitration," Congress, pursuant to its authority to regulate commerce,4 9
withdrew the authority of the states to require judicial adjudication of claims that
contracting parties have agreed to resolve by arbitration.50 Among other things,5'
37. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 27 n.34.
42. Id.
43. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 10-11.
50. Id. at 10.
51. The court also recognized that exempting state courts from the dictates of the FAA, especially in
light of the fact that the majority of litigation takes place in state courts, would "encourage and reward
forum shopping," thereby substantially thwarting the aim of the FAA to ensure parties who agree to
arbitrate enjoy a speedy resolution of their dispute. Id. at 15.
20051
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the Court also relied on indications in the legislative history of the FAA that Con-
gress intended to redress judicial hostility against arbitration in both state and
federal courts.52 In a decision that remains open to fierce debate to this day,53 the
Supreme Court ultimately held that, by enacting the FAA, Congress established a
substantive arbitration rule that governed in both federal and state courts.54
Determining that the FAA applied in state courts raised the more pressing
question-how? In Keating, the Supreme Court, relying on the Supremacy
Clause, declared that the FAA "foreclose[d] state legislative attempts to undercut
the enforceability of arbitration agreements." 55 In other words, the FAA preempts
state laws that conflict with the FAA's mandate that arbitration agreements are
valid and enforceable, except upon such grounds that exist for the revocation of
any contract. With that, the Supreme Court held that the California Franchise
Investment Act, to the extent it required a judicial forum for adjudication of
claims, was preempted by the FAA.56
In cases subsequent to Keating, the Supreme Court has struck down many
other state laws that expose arbitration agreements to special, or unique, scrutiny.
In Perry v. Thomas, the Court invalidated a California statute that required wage
claims to proceed in a judicial forum, regardless whether there was an agreement
to arbitrate, because the statute conflicted directly with the FAA's mandate that
arbitration agreements be rigorously enforced.57
Similarly, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the Court held that the
FAA preempted a Montana statute that imposed special notice requirements only
on arbitration agreements, in part, because the policies of the FAA are "antitheti-
cal to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitration provi-
sions."58 The Court applied similar reasoning to strike down an Alabama statute
that made predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable 59 and a New York
court rule that prohibited an arbitrator from awarding punitive damages in all
circumstances.
60
52. See id. at 16.
53. Justice O'Connor issued a strong dissent, in which Justice Rehnquist joined, asserting that Con-
gress did not intend the FAA to govern in state courts and that the majority "utterly failed to recognize
the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA," which proved that "Congress intended to require
federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements." Id. at 22-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justices Scalia and Thomas continue to dissent in cases considering the application of the FAA to state
courts. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Thomas, J. dissenting). In
fact, Justice Scalia declared that, although he will not continue to dissent in future cases, he is prepared
to join with four other justices to overrule Keating. Id. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Draho-
zal, In Defense of Southland, supra note 11; Cf Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor directly stated, "I have no doubt that Congress could enact, in the first in-
stance, a federal arbitration statute that displaces most state arbitration laws. But I also have no doubt
that, in 1925, Congress enacted no such statute." Id.
54. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
55. Id. See also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 271-72 (explaining that the Keating court decided that,
although the FAA was substantive law, Congress enacted it pursuant to its authority to regulate com-
merce and admiralty and intended that it apply in state courts).
56. Keating, 465 U.S. at 16. A decade later, the Supreme Court, in Allied-Bruce, rejected a plain-
tiff's request, joined by each attorney general of twenty states, to reverse its decision in Keating.
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272.
57. 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987).
58. 517 U.S. 681,688 (1996).
59. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
60. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 52 (1995).
[Vol. I
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The fierce preemptive force of the FAA is not limited to state statutes-it ap-
plies with equal force to laws of judicial origin. 61 By virtue of section 2 of the
FAA, courts may apply state decisional law "if that law arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."
62
"Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contra-
,63vening [section] 2." But "[a] court may not ... in assessing the rights of liti-
gants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner
different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements un-
der state law." 64 According to the Supreme Court, this also means that courts may
not, in only an arbitration setting, pervert generally applicable state law contract
doctrines as a means of avoiding the FAA's proscriptions. The Supreme Court
has commanded that "a court [may not] rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be uncon-
scionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the state
legislature cannot.",65 In other words, a court may not "decide that a contract is
fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause."
66
With virtually no exceptions, the modem Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of the FAA's reach in case after case.6 7 For example, the Court has held
that the FAA applies with equal force to both common law and statutory claims.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court explained
that there is no basis in the terms of the FAA "for disfavoring agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims. 68 The Court rejected the notion that a party submitting a
statutory claim to arbitration relinquishes the substantive rights afforded by the
statute. 69 Instead, the party merely agrees to resolve the claim in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial forum. 70 The Court did, however, note that, as with any statutory
directive, the party resisting arbitration could prove that the pro-arbitration man-
date of the FAA was overridden by a contrary Congressional directive embodied
61. See Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 86 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that
"[c]ourt decisions on the preemptive effect of the FAA do not distinguish between state statutes, ad-
ministrative regulations and judicial decisions that burden arbitration agreements").
62. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
63. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,687 (1996).
64. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
67. The Supreme Court has treated issues involving collective bargaining agreements that contain
arbitration provisions, as opposed to individual agreements, in a different manner. In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, the Court held that an employee required to arbitrate an employment discrimination
claim pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is not precluded from later seeking
relief in court. 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974). Arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement will
necessarily involve not only the interests of a particular employee, but also the union and its relation-
ship with the employer. Id. at 58 n.19. The Supreme Court has held that this distinction between a
collective bargaining agreement and an individual agreement is of great significance and determined
that the rule of Gardner-Denver applies only to collectively bargained arbitration agreements. Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1991).
68. 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
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in the federal statute at issue. 71 This defense, definitionally, does not apply to
contrary directives by state legislatures.
The burden is on the party resisting arbitration to prove that, based on the
language, legislative history or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the
underlying purpose of the statute, Congress intended to mandate a judicial forum
for litigation of the statutory rights at issue. 72 In practice, the utility of this de-
fense is de minimis because the Supreme Court has already submitted a wide array
of statutory claims-including claims under RICO,73 the ADEA,74 the Sherman
Act75 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 193476-t0 the arbitral forum. The
circuit courts are in accord.77
The Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. is
of particular significance on the issue of arbitrability of statutory claims.7 8  In
Gilmer, the Court was asked to decide whether an employee could be compelled
to arbitrate a discrimination claim under the ADEA based on a predispute compul-
sory arbitration agreement. 79 The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that
"'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, [an employee] does not forego the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; [he] only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.' 80 The Court reaffirmed its earlier com-
mitment to the principle that arbitration is not, in and of itself, an inferior tribunal
for resolution of claims, even those claims dealing with matters involving funda-
mental civil rights.8'
71. Id. at 627-28.
72. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987).
73. See id. at 242.
74. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
75. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985).
76. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
77. See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 1998) (ADA, Rehabilita-
tion Act); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1991) (ERISA);
Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 878 F.2d 729, 730 (3d Cir. 1989) (Securities Act of 1933);
United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 2001) (False Claims Act); Walton v.
Rose Mobile Homes, L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2002) (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act);
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2003) (Title VII); Kowalski v. Chi-
cago Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1988) (Sherman Act); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage
Co., 346 F.3d 821, 822 (8th Cir. 2003) (FLSA); Paulson v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 905 F.2d 1251,
1254 (9th Cir. 1990) (Securities & Exchange Act of 1934); Adrian v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham &
Co., 841 F.2d 1059, 1060 (11 th Cir. 1988) (RICO; Securities & Exchange Act of 1934).
The glaring exception to the rule, albeit a dated one, is Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,
144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d
742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2003). In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress, by its enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, intended to preclude mandatory arbitration of civil rights claims, covered by
the FAA. Id. Every circuit other than the Ninth Circuit rejected Duffield. See Rosenberg v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1999); Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesell-
schaft, 365 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2004); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir.
1998); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 937 (4th Cir. 1999); Mouton v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 147 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cit. 1998); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th
Cir. 1999); Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11 th Cir. 2002). Eventually, the Ninth
Circuit itself-in an en banc decision--overturned Duffield. Luce, 345 F.3d at 744-45.
78. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
81. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991). Gilmer did establish cer-
tain criteria that must be met within the arbitration forum itself to ensure that the arbitration does not
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The Supreme Court has also expanded those provisions of the FAA that con-
fer jurisdiction. For example, the Court has held that the FAA's "involving com-
merce" requirement, as stated in section 2 of the FAA, is a signal of "Congress'
intent to exercise its Commerce Clause power to the full," and should be expan-
sively interpreted. 82 Section 2 of the FAA provides that it applies only to "a writ-
ten provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce .... 83 The Court has interpreted the phrase "involving
84
commerce" expansively to reach most arbitration agreements.
The use of the term "evidencing" led some courts and commentators to
speculate that, in non-maritime transactions, the FAA applied only if the terms of
the agreement revealed that the parties actually contemplated engaging in inter-
state commerce. 85 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Supreme Court
rejected this notion and reaffirmed that Congress, in enacting the FAA, exercised
its entire authority to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.86 The Court
interpreted the term "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" as equivalent
to the term "affecting commerce," which meant the FAA embraced all contracts
that involve commerce within its scope.87 Allied-Bruce tied the scope of the FAA
to the outer limits of the Commerce Clause, rather than to the vagaries of contrac-
tual intent.
While the Supreme Court has expanded those provisions of the FAA that con-
fer jurisdiction, it has simultaneously narrowed those provisions that limit it. For
example, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,88 the Court interpreted language
found in section 1 of the FAA that excludes the "contracts of employment of sea-
men, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or in-
terstate commerce" from the FAA.89 The Ninth Circuit had held that this provi-
sion excluded all employment contracts from coverage under the FAA.90 The
Court rejected this conclusion in Adams. In reaching its decision, the Supreme
Court refused to consider the legislative history of the FAA, and, instead, inter-
preted the text of the statute using the ejusdem generis statutory maxim (i.e., gen-
eral words following specific words are to be constructed to encompass objects
serve as a vehicle to cause a de facto waiver of statutory rights. See id. at 28-30. See also discussion
infra Section V.
82. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995).
83. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
84. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273.
85. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lum-
bard, J., concurring). The Chief Justice framed the jurisdictional inquiry under section 2 of the FAA as
to whether the parties contemplated substantial interstate commerce at the time they entered into the
agreement. Id. See also Janet M. Grossnickle, Note, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the
Federal Arbitration Act Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the Courtroom, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 769, 781 (1995).
86. 513 U.S. at 277.
87. Id. at 277-81.
88. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
89. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
90. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that labor and
employment contracts are outside the scope of the FAA), overruled by Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). The Ninth Circuit was the only court to take the position that
section 1 of the FAA excluded all employment contracts from the proscriptions of the Act. Adams,
532 U.S. at 110-11.
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similar in nature to the specific words). 91 Relying on this maxim, the Court nar-
rowed the exemption, "other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce," 92 to embrace only the employment contracts of transportation work-
ers.9 3 The Court deflected policy arguments favoring a broader reading of the
exemption based on alleged detriments to employees subject to arbitration agree-
ments. 94 Instead, the Court asserted that the benefits of arbitration do not "some-
how disappear when transferred to the employment context."95 The Court broad-
ened the scope of the FAA by expansively interpreting the component of the FAA
that confers jurisdiction (i.e., the phrase "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce . . .,,)96 and simultaneously limiting the portion of the FAA that nar-
rows jurisdiction (i.e., the phrase "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"). 97
As shown above, Congress and the Supreme Court have acted with vigilance
in enforcing the FAA, laying waste to laws that "single out arbitration provisions
for suspect status" and ever expanding the scope of the FAA.98 The premise of
this article is that California courts-and the Ninth Circuit-are proceeding on
precisely the opposite path. They do so by cloaking their judicial hostility to arbi-
tration in the doctrine of unconscionability. In contrast to a state statute that is
overtly anti-arbitration, the detection of California's "unique" application of un-
conscionability in an arbitration setting is-at least in most cases-a bit more
difficult to reveal. Below we summarize the doctrine of unconscionability as a
"generally applicable contract defense."
III. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY: A TRUE "GENERALLY
APPLICABLE CONTRACT DEFENSE"
Unconscionability is not new. The doctrine originated as an affirmative de-
fense to the enforcement of contractual provisions "that were so unfair as to shock
the conscience of the court."99 The doctrine originated in England and was ex-
pressly recognized by United States equity courts as early as 1795.'0° "This use
was consistent with the general concern of the equity courts to do justice between
the parties and to refrain from enforcing agreements that were unduly harsh or
oppressive or that had been imposed on one party by another through sharp deal-
ing or some other reprehensible action."' 10
91. Id. at 114-15.
92. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
93. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119 (stating that "[s]ection 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of em-
ployment of transportation workers").
94. Id. at 122-23.
95. Id. at 123.
96. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
97. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
98. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,687 (1996).
99. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.27 (2d ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
100. HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:06 (rev. ed. 1993).
101. HUNTER, CONTRACTS, supra note 100, § 19:06. In equity, the doctrine developed along both
substantive and procedural lines, with cases falling into usually one or the other category. JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: AvOIDANCE & REFORMATION § 29.2 (rev. ed. 2002). The substan-
tive cases primarily prevented default for late payment on mortgages, use of land by those holding in
trust, and enforcement of penalty clauses that infringe on legal remedies in the commercial context. Id.
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By the late 1800s, equity courts frequently used unconscionability to set aside
contracts. Courts of law, however, only rarely referred expressly to unconscion-
ability 10 2 and generally "resorted to imaginative flanking devices to defeat the
offending contract."' 1 3 These devices included failure of consideration, lack of
mutual assent, inadequacy of pleading, lack of integration in a written contract,
and findings of ambiguity where none existed.' °4 This trend of avoiding reference
to unconscionability diminished by the mid-twentieth century with landmark deci-
sions like Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 10 5 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.1o6 and Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 107 With the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) unconscionability provision in 1962, the doc-
trine was "officially" embraced by courts as a defense distinct from fraud, duress
and misrepresentation. 108 Like other contractual defenses, "the party asserting that
defense [of unconscionability] bears the burden of proving it by substantial evi-
dence." 1
°9
On the other hand, procedural cases voided contractual provisions for reasons such as misrepresenta-
tion and undue influence. Id.
102. Within the first 150 years after the formation of the United States, only 6 published cases ex-
pressly employed the unconscionability doctrine. HUNTER, CONTRACTS, supra note 100, § 19:06
(1993).
103. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, § 29.2.
104. Id.
105. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949). In Campbell Soup, the Third Circuit refused to grant the legal rem-
edy of specific performance because it found that the agreement between Campbell Soup and a carrot
grower was an "unconscionable bargain." Id. at 83. The contract at issue substantially favored Camp-
bell Soup at the expense of the grower because the grower was not only bound to sell all of his carrots
to Campbell Soup, but was also prohibited from selling to a different party if Campbell Soup did not
approve the sale first. Id. In addition, the contract allowed Campbell Soup to recover liquidated dam-
ages, but provided no similar recovery for the grower and, actually, precluded the grower from recov-
ering any damages for Campbell's breach. Id. Consequently, in spite of the fact that the grower
breached the contract by refusing to sell his carrots to Campbell Soup at the contract price, the court
refused to grant specific performance because it was "too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agree-
ment to entitle [Campbell Soup] to relief in a court of conscience." Id.
106. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In Henningsen, the court found that a car manufacturer's disclaimer
warranty was unconscionable and against public policy. Id. at 408. The court found determinative the
mass distribution of the warranty, its standardized form, and the inability to purchase a car without
agreeing to the terms. Id. at 390.
107. 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Williams, each defendant had entered into a contract
with a furniture store that specified any default of payment on an undue balance gave the store a right
to repossess the item. Id. at 447. The contract specified that payments received were to be "credited
pro rata on all outstanding leases." Id. Both defendants defaulted on a payment and, as a result of the
pro rata provision, defaulted on all purchases that they had previously made and not yet paid off. Id.
Defendants asserted unconscionability as an affirmative defense to the action for replevin brought
against them by the furniture store. Id. The lower court declined to rule on the affirmative defense and
explained that its failure to address the issue was because "review of the legislation in the District of
Columbia affecting retail sales and the pertinent decisions of the highest court in this jurisdiction
disclose ... no ground upon which this court can declare the contracts in question contrary to public
policy." Id. at 448. The appellate court, however, disagreed with this analysis of the common law and,
citing both Campbell Soup and Henningsen, enunciated the standard for what constitutes substantive
and procedural unconscionability. Id.
108. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 18:2 (4th ed. 1999). "[Tlhe UCC provision
on unconscionability was designed to do two things: (1) encourage courts to openly strike down provi-
sions of the type that had previously been denied enforcement at law, largely through covert means;
and (2) achieve a substantive merger of equity doctrine into law." CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note
101, § 29.2.
109. Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (11 th Cir. 2002).
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Although unconscionability is generally considered an accepted contract
principle," ° it is, by its very nature, vaguely defined."' This is due, in large
measure, to the strong public policy in favor of freedom of contract and the fact
intensive analysis that courts undertake in their opposition to reformation and
voidance of contractual agreements." 2  The United States Supreme Court has
declared unconscionable contracts to be those "that no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would
accept on the other."113 This very general characterization is reflected in the UCC
provision, which uncharacteristically failed to include a definition of the term." 4
While the definition remains imprecise, it is generally recognized that an uncon-
scionable agreement includes both substantive and procedural unconscionabil-
ity."'l In addition, the doctrine "condemns specific bargains and bargaining tech-
niques only if they are grossly unfair 'according to the mores and business prac-
tices of the time and place.""'
16
The doctrine of unconscionability has developed along both procedural and
substantive lines. The substantive unconscionability analysis scrutinizes the terms
of the contract, while procedural unconscionability evaluates the formation proc-
ess.117 While the substantive element requires a showing that "harsh, one-sided or
oppressive"' 8 provisions unreasonably favor one party over the other it does not
oblige the parties to accept equivalent rights and obligations or to enjoy equal
benefits." 9 Indeed, "[a] court will not relieve a party of his obligations under a
110. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, § 29.3.
111. "Unconscionability is one of the most amorphous terms in the law of contracts." Id. § 29.1.
112. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 108, § 18:10.
113. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing Earl of Chesterfield
v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 155 (1750)).
114. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, § 29.1-29.2. "[Tihe UCC defines a large number of
terms, but refrains from a definition of unconscionability. This omission points to a legislative intent
to utilize a term in the same general sense in which it has been employed in the legal system in the
past." Id. § 29.2. California has codified the doctrine of unconscionability. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1670.5(a) (2003). Section § 1670.5 instructs:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been uncon-
scionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id. This language is identical to the UCC section. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.
3d 473, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (comparing the California statute to UCC § 2-302). The commentary
to the Civil Code section is also the same as the UCC commentary. The only difference between the
two provisions "is that section 1670.5 [is] placed under the 'Unlawful Contracts' heading of division 3,
part 2, title 4 of the Civil Code [and] applies to all contracts rather than being limited to those sales
transactions governed by the Commercial Code." Id. at 485.
115. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 99, § 4.28.
116. United States v. Bedford Assocs., 657 F.2d 1300, 1313 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 128 (1963)).
117. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,
52 BuFF. L. REV. 185, 191 (2004).
118. Id. See also FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 99, § 4.28; LORD, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS, supra note 108, § 18:9 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965)).
119. Under federal law and the law of a majority of states, contractual agreements and arbitration
clauses "need not be supported by equivalent obligations." Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d
173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999). In Harris, the Third Circuit examined an arbitration agreement between
homeowners and a financial institution for unconscionability. Id. The district court had denied the
[Vol. I
14
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss1/7
California's "Unique" Approach
contract because he has made a bad bargain containing contractual terms which
are unreasonable or impose an onerous hardship on him."' 120  Rather, the court
must find that the contract provision was "so one-sided as to lead to absurd re-
sults" as determined by industry custom. 121
The procedural aspect requires surprise or the absence of meaningful choice
by the party with weaker bargaining power.12 2 Factors considered by courts in
determining whether procedural unconscionability is present include "the experi-
ence, intelligence, and education of the parties, their relative bargaining power,
the presence or absence of meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party, the
conspicuousness and clarity of the contract terms, and other factors.' 23 Indeed, a
court may ask, whether "each party to the contract, considering his obvious educa-
tion or lack of it, [has] a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and mini-
mized by deceptive sales practices?"'' 24 If, however, a party to an agreement does
"not attempt to determine if anyone else could provide th[e] service" requested,
then procedural unconscionability will not be found even where the party is
"given no opportunity to negotiate the terms of th[e] agreement."' 125
Not all allocations of risk that appear unreasonable are unconscionable. 126 The
requisite amounts of procedural and substantive unconscionability that must be
present are fact specific and assessed on a sliding scale "such that the greater the
unfair surprise or inequality of bargaining power, the less unreasonable the risk
reallocation which will be tolerated."'127  On the sliding scale, "the greater the
harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms, the less important the
regularity of the process of contract formation that gave rise to the term be-
comes."'
128
institution's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that it "lacked the requisite mutuality and,
therefore, was unconscionable." Id. at 178. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the denial and stated
that it was "of no legal consequence that the arbitration clause gives Green Tree the option to litigate
arbitrable issues in court, while requiring the Harrises to invoke arbitration." Id. at 181.
120. Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
121. Troy Mining Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 346 S.E.2d 749, 752 (W. Va. 1986).
122. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 99, § 4.28; LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra
note 108, § 18:9.
123. Randall, supra note 117, at 191.
124. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). California
decisions in a non-arbitration setting have followed a similar analysis. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC
Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). In A & M Produce, a farmer bought weight
equipment from a manufacturer pursuant to a sales contract entered into by both parties. See id. at
478-79. The contract was on a long, pre-printed form and required a down payment before the equip-
ment was delivered and installed. Id. at 500. The farmer paid the deposit and the machinery was
installed. Id. at 479. When it did not work as he had been told it would the farmer attempted to return
the product and recover the down payment when the manufacturer refused. Id. at 480. The farmer
brought an action for damages and the court held that the contract was unconscionable because the
warranty and disclaimer terms were buried in the form contract. Id. at 493 (concluding that the trial
court was correct in finding unconscionability).
125. Fotomat, 464 So. 2d at 631.
126. A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 487. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (2004), Legislative
Committee Comment (1979) (the principle of unconscionability is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise and not the disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power).
127. A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 487.
128. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 108, §18:14.
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IV. THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF THE FAA AND ITS CONVERGENCE WITH
THE STATE LAW DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
Four years ago, in Armendariz, the California Supreme Court redefined the
judicial landscape related to the viability of arbitration agreements. 29 The Ar-
mendariz court had before it the enforceability of a compulsory predispute arbitra-
tion agreement that applied to statutory employment discrimination claims. 130 The
court rejected an argument that such claims are per se not arbitrable, but focused
its decision on two issues related to enforcement of arbitration agreements.
First, the Armendariz court considered procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability, the two generally accepted elements of the contract defense, which
the court held applies to all arbitration agreements irrespective of the claim at
issue. The court held that "few employees are in a position to refuse a job because
of an arbitration agreement" and that when an agreement is presented to an em-
ployee or prospective employee on a take it or leave it basis the element of proce-
dural unconscionability is satisfied.1 31 On the issue of substantive unconscionabil-
ity, the court held that an employer-employee arbitration agreement must contain
a "modicum of bilaterality" and not commit the employee to the arbitration forum
while reserving the right of the employer to go to court without some "business
realit[y]" justifying the lack of mutuality. 13 2
Second, as to claims affecting public rights (e.g., employment discrimination
claims), the Armendariz court held that in order for an arbitration agreement to be
enforceable it must meet certain "minimum requirements": (1) no limitation of
available remedies; (2) adequate discovery; (3) a written arbitration decision set-
ting forth, however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the
decision is based; and (4) all expenses unique to arbitration are to be borne by the
employer. 133 These "minimum requirements," which do not, at least by reason of
Armendariz, apply to an unconscionability analysis are addressed in Section V.
Armendariz set off a literal fire storm of reported decisions related to the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements under California law; that fire is still raging
today. As shown below, these decisions have, among other things, required strict
mutuality-if not more-in arbitration agreements and the courts, ostensibly fol-
lowing Armendariz, routinely strike down agreements on this basis.
With this backdrop in mind, we turn again to the settled law. The United
States Supreme Court has held that "as a matter of federal law, any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or
an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."' 34 But, as we
129. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). For a further
discussion of Armendariz, see infra Section V.
130. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 669.
131. Id. at 690.
132. Id. at 690-91.
133. See generally id.
134. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989) (quoting Moses
H. 460 U.S. at 25).
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explained more fully in Section II, this does not mean that states may not apply
any of their own laws when it comes to arbitration agreements.
The "savings clause," found in section 2 of the FAA, permits courts to apply
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionabil-
ity . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements."' 135 Indeed, the FAA preserves the
authority of courts to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 136  In
Perry, however, the Supreme Court cautioned that such state laws may only be
relied upon if "[they] arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability,
and enforceability of contracts generally."' 137  Arbitration agreements must be
treated the same as any other contracts-no better, no worse-irrespective of the
fact that they have "arbitration" as their focus.
This seemingly bland pronouncement of federal arbitration law has, as in the
case of California, been easier stated than applied. Unconscionability has pre-
sented particular difficulty. 38 As shown above, it is an axiomatic principle that
any unconscionability analysis requires a court to assess whether the contract is
"substantively" unconscionable. This is, by definition, a fact specific inquiry that
derives its very meaning from, among other things, the subject matter of the con-
tract being evaluated. 1
39
This presents a curious dilemma, as the United States Supreme Court has held
that "a court may [not] rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a
basis for . . . holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would
enable the court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot." 40  Similarly, a
principle of state law that "takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract
to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the] requirement of [section] 2."'
141
135. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,
492 n.9 (1987).
136. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
137. Doctor's Associates, 517 U.S. at 687 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9).
138. Years before section 2 of the FAA became an issue in the courts, commentators foresaw the
potential difficulty in applying the unconscionability doctrine under the FAA:
State unconscionability rules pose a unique and difficult problem for courts applying a
nondiscrimination test. A state rule that held all arbitration agreements unconscionable per se
would be essentially a disguised version of the common law rule that arbitration agreements are
unenforceable and would clearly conflict with section 2 of the Act. Assuming that a state applies
its unconscionability rules both to arbitration agreements and to other contract terms, the difficult
question becomes whether the Act ever permits a state to hold an arbitration agreement uncon-
scionable. On the one hand, the Act contemplates that the full range of legal and equitable de-
fenses to the enforcement of any contract will be available to parties opposing arbitration, and
many states recognize an unconscionability defense to contract enforcement. On the other hand,
a finding of unconscionability seems to reflect a judicial determination that arbitration is unfair, a
view that implies judicial hostility toward arbitration.
Note, Incorporation of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1391, 1411
(1980) (internal citations omitted).
139. Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., I ll Cal. App. 4th 660, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
"unconscionability is a flexible doctrine designed to allow courts to consider numerous factors in
determining whether a contract is unconscionable"); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77,
89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that "numerous factual issues may bear on" the question of uncon-
scionability).
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The only apparent means of reconciling these seemingly conflicting princi-
ples starts with the most basic statement of the FAA. The FAA was a prophylac-
tic statute enacted to "reverse centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments by placing them on equal footing with other contracts."'142 Similarly, and
consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has held that "we are well past
the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the com-
petence of arbitral tribunals" should inhibit enforcement of the FAA.
143
One rule can be distilled from the above: in applying an unconscionability
analysis to an arbitration agreement, a court may not presume that arbitration in
and of itself is inferior to a court proceeding or apply some "unique" unconscion-
ability test to arbitration agreements. There are certainly gray areas in any rea-
soned analysis of whether the unconscionability doctrine is applied in an arbitra-
tion specific manner by a particular court. As we show below in Section IV,
much of California's decisional law tests these boundaries, as its hostility to arbi-
tration is transparent. Below we deal with a less gray area, where California
courts-and the Ninth Circuit-have changed the unconscionability doctrine to
strike down arbitration agreements. We focus on arbitration in an employment
setting because, as demonstrated by Armendariz and its progeny, this is, at pre-
sent, the most litigated area in arbitration law.
A. The FAA Preempts California's (and the Ninth Circuit's) Arbitration
Specific Doctrine of Unconscionability
Professor Karl Llewellyn once wrote that "covert tools are never reliable
tools."' 44 This quote is apropos to any current discussion of unconscionability and
arbitration agreements in California. California courts and the Ninth Circuit are
not applying the "unconscionability" doctrine as any other court-
or, in fact, these courts-have known it in the past. It is a new form of "uncon-
scionability," known only to arbitration and only to California. Its apparent aim is
to accomplish what the FAA commands cannot be done. And it does so all under
the guise of a "generally applicable contract defense."'
145
There is irony in the fact that, as a general contract principle, the "uncon-
scionability" doctrine was developed, in part, to stop courts from disingenuously
using "imaginative flanking devices" and "surreptitious" means to avoid enforce-
142. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987). See also Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36 (1991).
143. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985).
144. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 365 (1960) (quoting
Karl Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law, 52
HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1937)).
145. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (giving examples of "generally
applicable contract defenses"). A useful analogy to the issues under the FAA involving unconscion-
ability is drawn by looking to equal protection cases that distinguish between those laws that facially
discriminate and those that are neutral on their face but administered in a discriminatory manner.
Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute prohibiting interracial marriages) with Louisi-
ana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (statute requiring that all potential voters understand the
Constitution irrespective of race).
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ment of what they perceived as overly harsh and unfair contracts. 46 In the context
of arbitration, the remedy has become the ill.' 47 To avoid the FAA's preemptive
scope, California's courts (and the Ninth Circuit) are cloaking their inherent bias
against arbitration in the "unconscionability" doctrine. We address two of the
most extreme examples below.
1. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores and the Rebuttable Presumption of Substan-
tive Unconscionability
On the first day of law school-and, in particular, the first day of contracts
class-nearly every American law student had the following blackletter principle
etched in her mind: contracts, legal in subject matter, will be enforced as written
unless the party resisting enforcement of the contract can establish a defense to
enforcement.148 That is the law; it has always been the law. And nothing is dif-
ferent for the defense of unconscionability. Indeed, "[t]he party asserting the de-
fense of unconscionability must prove it."' 149 Not so in the Ninth Circuit when
dealing with arbitration agreements assessed under California law (at least in an
employment setting).
In Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, the Ninth Circuit, applying California law,
manipulated the contractual defense of unconscionability in an arbitration setting
under California law and held that "a contract to arbitrate between an employer
and an employee ... raises a rebuttable presumption of substantive unconscion-
ability.' 50 The Ingle court did nothing short of reinterpret the doctrine of uncon-
scionability by placing the burden of proof on the party seeking enforcement of a
contract to show affirmatively that it is not substantively unconscionable. Yet,
that is not how generally applicable contract defenses work. No California state
court had adopted the "rebuttable presumption" standard prior to Ingle, and none
has adopted it since. The fact that Ingle is in an employment setting is irrelevant,
as the Supreme Court has been "clear in rejecting the supposition that the advan-
146. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 401 (3d ed. 1987); John A.
Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 PA. L. REV. 931, 931 (1969) (describing
unconscionability as a "fashionable ... all-purpose weapon against [all] contract problems").
147. California and North Carolina were the only two jurisdictions to omit section 2-302 when origi-
nally adopting the UCC. In California, this was in 1962. The California State Bar Committee on the
UCC, in a bit of foreshadowing, explained that the rationale behind this decision was based on a con-
cern about potentially excessive discretion on the part of judges to strike down contracts based on
subjective, indeterminate views of unfairness. California State Bar Committee on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 117, 135-36 (1962).
148. See, e.g., Steven W. Feldman, Resolving Contractual Ambiguity in Tennessee: A Systematic
Approach, 68 TENN. L. REV. 73, 75 n.6 (2000); Ballard v. N. Am. Life & Cas. Co., 667 S.W.2d 79, 82
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that absent grounds for avoidance, "a contract must be interpreted
and enforced as written even though it contains terms which may be thought harsh and unjust"). See
generally FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 99, § 19.
149. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 99, § 4.28. Notably, Professor Farnsworth was the
reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See also Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc.,
15 Cal. 4th 951, 972 (Cal. 1997); Woodside Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 107 Cal. App. 4th 723,
727-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (stating "the party asserting unconscionability as a defense has the burden
of establishing that condition"); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1099 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (stating that "the party opposing arbitration has the burden of proving the arbitration provision is
unconscionable"); Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1715, 1738-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
150. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
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tages of the arbitration process somehow disappear when transferred to the em-
ployment context."
'151
The "basis" for the Ingle court's holding is troubling. The Ingle court held
that substantive unconscionability exists where the "terms of the agreement...
are so one-sided as to shock the conscience."1 52 The holding in Ingle was not a
controversial statement of the law. But in the Ninth Circuit's view, it does not
matter whether the text of the agreement commits employers as well as employees
to arbitration. The mere fact that the agreement is between an employer and em-
ployee is enough to make it so one-sided as to "shock the conscience":
[Where an] arbitration agreement subjects [an employer] to the same
terms that apply to its employees.., the agreement is one-sided anyway.
Because the possibility that [an employer] would initiate an action
against one of its employees is so remote, the lucre of the arbitration
agreement flows one way .... The only claims realistically affected by
an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee are those
claims employees bring against their employers.
53
Ingle-at least on its face-does allow an employer to rebut the presumption
of substantive unconscionability by demonstrating that the "effect of a contract to
arbitrate is bilateral ... with respect to a particular employee."'' 54 In practice, how
an employer can do this, when bilateral contract language is itself not enough, is a
mystifying question. Not surprisingly, no employer has done so yet.1
55
The Ninth Circuit's rule is obviously arbitration specific and applies uncon-
scionability in a manner that takes "its meaning precisely from the fact that a con-
tract to arbitrate is at issue." Furthermore, the Ingle court based its decision on a
concern that employees are required to "waive their right to seek redress in the
judicial forum," irrespective of the attributes of the arbitrable forum provided for
by the arbitration agreement. This is precisely the type of generalized judicial
hostility to arbitration that the FAA was enacted to overcome. The FAA does not
countenance the Ingle court's brand of arbitration specific unconscionability. No
matter what name it bears, unconscionability under Ingle is no longer a state law
"that arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability and enforceabil-
ity of contracts generally," 5 6 and it is preempted by the FAA.
151. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).
152. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th
1322, 1330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
153. Id. at 1174.
154. Id. This defense has not been applied in practice. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335
F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that "perhaps under other circumstances we would find it
necessary to remand to the district court to allow Circuit City to present evidence tending to rebut the
presumption that its arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable, we need not remand in this
case").
155. General principles of California contract law do not allow a court to look behind facially mutual
contract language to make an assessment of which party will bear the greater risk under a contract. See
Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d I (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that a mutual waiver of liability in a contract for the use of a rocket to lift a communications satellite
was not unconscionable when the satellite did not reach its desired orbit, thereby causing $105 million
in damages on a $6 million contract).
156. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
[Vol. I
20
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss1/7
California's "Unique" Approach
2. Mutuality in Arbitration Agreements: If Notfor Suspicion of the Arbi-
tral Forum, Why Is It Required?
In Ingle, the Ninth Circuit created a completely new rule of unconscionabil-
ity. The procedural application of the doctrine was changed to strike down an
arbitration agreement. By requiring "mutuality" of obligation in arbitration
agreements-and only arbitration agreements-California courts have applied a
heightened standard of unconscionability in the arbitration context. In any as-
sessment of unconscionability, the question of mutuality is a fair matter for con-
sideration. It bears on the question of whether an agreement is so "one sided" as
to "shock the conscience." But, mutuality of obligation is not, nor has it ever
been, the benchmark for any general unconscionability analysis in California.
In Armendariz, the California Supreme Court added a gloss to the doctrine of
unconscionability by reasoning that an arbitration agreement is substantively un-
conscionable when "it requires one contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate
all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. '57 The court ex-
pressly acknowledged that the application of this mutuality requirement in its
unconscionability analysis manifests itself in "forms peculiar to the arbitration
context."'' 58 The Armendariz court believed that "it [was] unfairly one-sided for
an employer ... to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to ac-
cept such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee,
without at least some reasonable justification ... based on 'business realities.""1 59
Absent a mutual obligation to arbitrate, the court believed that arbitration becomes
a "means of maximizing employer advantage."'' 60 This is true irrespective of the
substantive and procedural attributes of the arbitral forum agreed to by the parties.
Such a rule expressly violates the United States Supreme Court's command that,
at least irrespective of the attributes of the forum, "arbitration affects only the
choice of forum, not substantive rights."' 6' If not for an inherent bias or assump-
tion that arbitration is less desirable-which is prohibited by the FAA-the issue
of mutuality would not be relevant.
Not surprisingly, no lower court has yet to find any business reality sufficient
to justify a departure from a strict requirement of "mutuality" in the text of an
arbitration agreement. Indeed, California courts have gone so far as to strike
down agreements with a sole-and facially mutual--carve-out for "injunctive
relief from any court having jurisdiction with respect to any disputes or claims
relating to or arising out of the misuse or appropriation of the [c]ompany's trade
secrets or confidential and proprietary information."' 62 While this strict require-
157. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 2000).
158. Id. at 692.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.10 (2002)). See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
162. Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
the employment contract at issue); Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 4th 167, 176-77 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Mercuro
and holding substantively unconscionable a facially mutual exclusion of "claims for injunctive and/or
other equitable relief for intellectual property violations, unfair competition and/or the use and/or
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ment of "mutuality" in the text of an arbitration agreement is less drastic than the
Ingle holding, that even facially mutual agreements are not in fact mutual, it is
nevertheless still preempted by the FAA.
First, and as a general matter, California law does not, outside of an arbitra-
tion context, require strict mutuality of obligation as a precondition to enforce-
ment of contracts, so this is a "unique" rule that applies only in an arbitration set-
ting. t63 Indeed, such a rule has been widely rejected. '64 Second, the requirement
unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information"); Flores v. Transamerica Home-
First, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that carve out for foreclosure
proceedings in real estate contract is substantively unconscionable); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp.,
118 Cal. App. 4th 107, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing to Mercuro); O'Hare v. Mun. Res. Consult-
ants. 107 Cal. App. 4th 267, 273-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (carve out allowing employer, but not em-
ployee, to seek injunctive or equitable relief is unconscionable).
163. Compare Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Vars, Pave, McCord & Freedman, 65 Cal. App. 4th
1469, 1488-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (mortgage agreement provision enforceable despite unilateral
nature; "Where sufficient consideration is present, mutuality is not essential."), Hillsman v. Sutter
Cmty. Hosp., 153 Cal. App. 3d 743, 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding employment contract enforce-
able despite unilateral nature if consideration requirement is properly met, a "mutuality of obligation"
is unneccessary), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(c) (1981) (stating that "[ilf the re-
quirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of. . . 'mutuality of obligation,"),
2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNIKAS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 6.1 (rev. ed.
1995) (noting that "[tihe concept of 'mutuality' is an appealing one. It seems to connote equality,
fairness, justice .... But symmetry is not justice and the so-called requirement of mutuality of obliga-
tion is now widely discredited"), and 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 7.14 (4th ed. 1992), with Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003)
(advising that "[i]n determining whether an arbitration agreement is sufficiently bilateral, courts as-
sessing California law look beyond facial neutrality and examine the actual effects of the challenged
provision") (citing Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002), and
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
164. See, e.g., Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d 788, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that "under
Oklahoma law, mutuality of obligation is not required for arbitration clauses so long as the contract as
a whole is supported by consideration"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451-53 (2d
Cir. 1995) (noting that "where the agreement to arbitrate is integrated into a larger unitary contract, the
consideration for the contract as a whole covers the arbitration clause as well") (quoting W.L. Jorden
& Co. v. Blythe Indus., 702 F. Supp. 282, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1988)); Hurdle v. Fairbanks Capital Corp.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18357, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002) (finding "sufficient, if unequal, consid-
eration"); Morgan v. Bill Kay Chrysler Plymouth, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18460, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July
17, 2002) (asserting that "even if Bill Kay is not obligated to arbitrate any claims, the contract is
clearly supported by consideration on both sides"); Sparks v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11808, at *14 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2002) (noting that "[n]either federal nor Texas state law
requires that an arbitration clause have mutuality of obligation, provided that the underlying contract is
supported by adequate consideration"); Pridgen v. Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d
655. 659 (D. Miss. 2000) (declaring that because "mutuality of obligation is not required for a contract
to be enforceable.., the arbitration clause is not unenforceable"); Raesly v. Grand Housing, Inc., 105
F. Supp. 2d 562, 570 (D. Miss. 2000) (following Pridgen); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (D. Ala. 2000) (finding that "Circuit City's promise to be bound by the arbitration
process and results of employee disputes that are initiated by employees is sufficient consideration in
this case"); Kelly v. UHC Mgmt. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240, 1260 (D. Ala. 1997) (explaining that
"[aissuming that [the parties' agreements] do not contain 'mutuality of obligation,' the court is of the
opinion that such mutuality is not required for a valid arbitration agreement to exist. All that is required
is consideration [and] [blecause the agreements do not lack consideration, they are enforceable con-
tracts"); Latifi v. Sousa, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19052, at *15 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 1996) (explaining
that "the [c]ourt is convinced that Alabama uses the unitary approach to consideration and does not
impose any additional 'mutuality' requirement"); Design Benefit Plans, Inc. v. Enright, 940 F. Supp.
200, 205 (D. 111. 1996) (asserting that "this court is of the opinion that the Illinois Supreme Court, if
presented with the issue, would not find an arbitration clause, which compels one party to submit all
disputes to arbitration but allows the other party the choice of pursuing arbitration or litigation, to be
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of mutuality-when it is viewed apart from the specifics of the arbitral forum-
reflects a firmly held "judicial hostility" towards arbitration. It rests on nothing
less than an assumption that arbitration, just because it is arbitration, is less desir-
able than litigation.
Put another way, a typical unconscionability analysis requires a court to as-
sess whether an agreement is so "one-sided" as to "shock the conscience.,
65
California courts have invoked this test to invalidate what they perceive as non-
mutual arbitration agreements, holding that "a unilateral arbitration agreement
imposed by an employer without reasonable justification" is substantively uncon-
scionable.166 This is true without regard to any substantive evaluation of the arbi-
tral forum contemplated by the agreement. The only way that such an agreement
can be viewed as unconscionable is if the forum of arbitration is perceived as infe-
rior to court. If this were not the assumption, there would be no reason to declare
the agreement one-sided.
The FAA does not permit courts to make these types of inherently biased, and
generalized, judgments about arbitration. Indeed, "while the deprivation of one's
right to seek legal redress in a court might at first glance appear contrary to some
stronger public policy, the Supreme Court has stated that an arbitral forum stands
on equal footing with a court of law, insofar as the ability to resolve legal disputes
is concerned."
167
invalid for lack of mutuality of obligation or remedy where the contract as a whole is otherwise sup-
ported by consideration on both sides"); Gadsden Budweiser Distrib. Co. v. Holland, 807 So. 2d 528,
531 (Ala. 2001) (declaring that "we do not find the arbitration provision to be unenforceable for a lack
of 'mutuality of obligation'); Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 596 (Ala. 1998) (finding that
"United's provision of new at-will employment to McNaughton was sufficient consideration to make
McNaughton's promise to arbitrate employment disputes under United's arbitration policy a binding
agreement"); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding that because consideration was present from each party "the arbitration provision is not unen-
forceable simply because it does not require defendant to arbitrate"); Avid Eng'g, Inc. v. Orlando
Marketplace Ltd., 809 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that "[b]ecause there was suffi-
cient consideration to support the entire contract, the arbitration provision was not void for lack of
mutuality of obligation"); Bishop v. We Care Hair Dev. Corp., 738 N.E.2d 610, 623 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000) (finding that "[t]he fact that the parties agreed to allow We Care Hair to litigate any breach of
the sublease is not itself fatal since parties do not have to agree to identical obligations"); Lackey v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898, 905 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (declaring that "there is no require-
ment that the consideration for one party's obligation to arbitrate all issues under a contract be the
other party's obligation to arbitrate all issues under that contract"); In re Firstmerit Bank, N.A., 52
S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001) (determining that "an arbitration clause does not require mutuality of
obligation, so long as the underlying contract is supported by adequate consideration" and stating that
"[m]ost federal courts" have accepted this view).
165. Hicks v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that "[t]o be substantively
unconscionable, a contractual provision must shock the conscience"); Kinney v. United Healthcare
Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
166. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 693-94 (Cal. 2000);
Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
167. Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 864 (D. Ohio 2003) (citing Rodriguez De Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 487 (1989)) (stating that "[q]uite simply, the act of replac-
ing an employee's access to the courts for airing employment-related disputes with access to an arbitral
forum, provided it appears fair and impartial, cannot be viewed as a penalty or the like"). See also
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000) (quoting Rodriguez De Quijas, 490 U.S.
at 487, and stating "[w]e have likewise rejected generalized attacks on arbitration that rest on 'suspi-
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The United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting section 2 of the FAA
forbids courts from submitting arbitration agreements to special, or "peculiar,"
scrutiny. 6 8 "The 'goals and policies' of the FAA... are antithetical to threshold
limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitration provisions."' 69  Indeed,
courts may not even consider the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue in as-
sessing whether the agreement is unconscionable.170 The conclusion that Califor-
nia courts are doing just that is, quite frankly, inescapable.' 7 1
V. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT--OR, MORE OFTEN, NON-ENFORCEMENT-
OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
A. Judicial Suspicions Abound
In addition to the clear cut examples discussed above, the hostility to arbitra-
tion by California courts comes in more subtle forms as well. For example, not-
withstanding the dictates of the FAA, the California Supreme Court has explicitly
acknowledged its suspicion of arbitration agreements and its deeply rooted doubts
regarding the fairness of arbitration, particularly in an employment setting. 172 In
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the California Su-
preme Court stated that "[w]hile arbitration may have its advantages in terms of
greater expedition, informality and lower cost, it also has, from the employee's
168. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
169. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,688 (1996).
170. Id. At least one decision, by a lone United States District Court Judge, has held that the Armen-
dariz court's requirement of mutuality singles out arbitration for suspect status. Gray v. Conseco, Inc.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14821 (D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) (disagreeing "with the California Supreme
Court in so far as it held that its rule did not single out and impose a special burden on arbitration
agreements [because] [u]nder California law, other non-mutual contract provisions are valid and are
not unconscionable"). See infra Section IV (for full discussion of Armendariz).
171. In Hull v. Norcom, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit, applying New York law, held that an employment
arbitration agreement that allowed the employer (and only the employer) "to institute and prosecute
proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction... to obtain damages.., or [injunctive relief]" was
invalid for lack of consideration. 750 F.2d 1547, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1985). The leading treatise on
federal arbitration law contends that this decision, which has since been widely rejected, violates the
FAA:
The Hull case is incorrectly decided. Contrary to its assertion, the court did not decide the case
by applying "general contract" principles of New York. There is, of course, no New York "gen-
eral contract" principle that each provision in a contract must have its own consideration. The
Hull court simply decided the case on the basis of New York arbitration law. New York law, ac-
cording to the court, required arbitration clauses to have their own consideration. That law
treated arbitration differently than would general New York contract law. This adverse discrimi-
natory treatment is invalid under Southland Corp. v. Keating, and the court should have so held.
If there was any doubt of this at the time of Hull, it has been removed by the language.., from
Perry v. Thomas.
2 IAN R. MACNEL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, & REMEDIES
UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 17:59 (Supp. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Of course,
Hull involved a completely unilateral agreement, which is far more objectionable than the facially
mutual agreements that are routinely struck down by California courts.
172. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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point of view, potential disadvantages: waiver of a right to a jury trial, 17 limited
discovery, and limited judicial review."' 174
In the court's view, arbitration is correspondingly advantageous to employers
"not only because it reduces the cost of litigation, but also because it reduces the
size of the award that an employee is likely to get, particularly if the employer is a
'repeat player' in the arbitration system."'' 75 The potential disadvantages that the
California Supreme Court detects for employee litigants "even [in] a fair arbitra-
tion system" has compelled California courts to remain "particularly attuned to
claims that employers with superior bargaining power have imposed one-sided,
substantively unconscionable terms as part of an arbitration agreement." 176 As we
show below, in the context of arbitration, there has been very little that California
courts have not found unconscionable.
77
1. Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the "oppression" or "surprise" of a
contracting party due to unequal bargaining power. 178  "California courts have
consistently held that where a party in a position of unequal bargaining power is
presented with an offending clause without the opportunity for meaningful nego-
tiation ... procedural unconscionability [is] present."' 179 In California, this usually
takes the form of a contract of adhesion, which is imposed and drafted "by the
party of superior bargaining strength [and] relegates to the subscribing party only
the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.' ' 80
In the context of arbitration, and in particular, in an employment setting, Cali-
fornia courts have taken a paternalistic approach and stretched this doctrine well
173. Id. at 115. In a non-arbitration setting, a lone California appellate court recently held-and in so
doing overruled prior decisions-that a contractual predispute waiver of a jury trial is unenforceable as
a matter of law. Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 700, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
The California Supreme Court recently accepted review of this decision. 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004).
174. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. Outside of an employment context, the California Supreme Court
has also resisted permitting arbitration of certain types of claims. In Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys.,
Inc., the California Supreme Court held that claims for injunctive relief under the California Consumer
Legal Remedies Act are not arbitrable. 30 Cal. 4th 303, 307 (Cal. 2003). The court rejected an argu-
ment that such a holding would violate the FAA, stating that the Supreme Court "has never directly
decided whether a legislature may restrict a private arbitration agreement when it inherently conflicts
with a public statutory purpose that transcends private interests." Id. at 313. Justice Chin, in a vigor-
ous dissent (joined by two other justices), argued that the majority's holding was preempted by the
FAA. Id. at 322 (Chin, J., dissenting). See also Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 21 Cal. 4th
1066 (Cal. 1999).
175. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. The hostility expressed by the Armendariz court has, on at least one
occasion, crept into federal decisions applying another state's law. See, e.g., Lelouis v. W. Directory
Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (D. Or. 2001) (applying Armendariz standard of unconscionability to
invalidate an arbitration agreement under Oregon law).
176. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 (emphasis added).
177. In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit went as far as to hold that employees may not, as a condition of
employment, be required to arbitrate claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by EEOC v.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2003).
178. Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
179. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2002).
180. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 817 (Cal. 1981) (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins.
Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)).
2005]
25
McGuiness and Karr: McGuiness: California's Unique Approach to Arbitration
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
beyond any logical formulation. In Armendariz, the court stated, "in the case of
pre-employment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure exerted by employ-
ers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the
arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment,
and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration re-
quirement."'18
Accordingly, courts applying California law have held that procedural uncon-
scionability can be found even in cases in which the employee had "ample time to
consider alternatives to [the employer's] terms of employment" and the contract
was "written in plain English."'' 82 Furthermore, in an arbitration setting, courts
have held that "whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to decline the defendant's
contract and instead ... enter into a contract with another party that does not [con-
tain] the offending terms" has no bearing on whether the contract is procedurally
unconscionable.' 83  This is in stark contrast to non-arbitration cases, in which
courts have held that the availability of alternative providers strips the contract of
any element of procedural unconscionability.'84
Courts applying California law have gone so far as to find procedural uncon-
scionability in arbitration agreements in circumstances where the contract is, in
any traditional sense, not presented on a take it or leave it basis. 85 In Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, the Ninth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement was
procedurally unconscionable despite the fact that the employee was given an opt-
out form.' 8  According to the court, the opt-out form was not enough to "save the
agreement" because management had "impliedly and expressly pressured" the
employee into signing it.' 87 These actions, said the court, deprived the employee
181. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. In reality, California courts have consistently held that procedural
unconscionability can be found in an arbitration setting even with the most "sought after employees."
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (procedural unconscion-
ability found in arbitration agreement between high level executive and company even when company
sought out and "hired away" employee from another high level and highly compensated position);
Graham, 28 Cal. 3d at 818, 831 (holding that Bill Graham, "the dominant rock music impresario of his
generation," was subjected to a contract of adhesion in signing an arbitration agreement).
182. Ferguson, 298 F. 3d at 784.
183. Id. See also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that
the fact that employee had three days to consider the agreement had no bearing on the issue of proce-
dural unconscionability); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
184. Hicks v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 77, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("comparable housing was
available in the area, all supporting the view that the ... agreement was not, in reality, a contract of
adhesion").
185. Szetela, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1100 ("even if the clause at issue here is not an adhesion contract, it
can still be found unconscionable"); Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 100 Cal. App. 4th 1081, 1087
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that "[i]n any event, even if the parties' agreements were deemed not to
be adhesive, plaintiffs have established the judicial reference provisions of those agreements were
unconscionable at the time such agreements were made"); Bolter v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App. 4th 900,
908 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that "adhesive arbitration agreements are not per se unconscion-
able").
186. 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). But see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198,
1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that agreement in which employee is given an opportunity to "opt
out" by "mailing in a simple one page form" and is "encouraged to ... consult an attorney prior to
deciding whether to participate in the program" is not procedurally unconscionable); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2002) (reaching same conclusion as in Ahmed,
under identical agreement).
187. Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1106.
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of any "meaningful, reasonable choice" to reject the terms, rendering the agree-
ment procedurally unconscionable. 88 Even in those cases where no evidence of
procedural unconscionability is presented, courts have looked solely to the terms
of the agreement to find unconscionability.8 9
One of the most perplexing California court decisions interpreting this ele-
ment is McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp.'90 The McManus court held that
a form U-4, which is a required and SEC-approved Uniform Application for Secu-
rities Industry Registration or Transfer, 191 was a contract of adhesion vis-A-vis the
employee and employer because it was imposed as a condition of employment
with no opportunity to negotiate. 192 The court, however, failed even to consider
that, if there were compulsion, it actually flowed from the mandate of the federal
and California laws that required McManus to register with the NASD and NYSE
as a prerequisite to working in the securities industry and not from his employer.
The court also failed to acknowledge that the U-4, an SEC approved form, was not
"drafted by the party seeking to enforce" the contract. 1
93
The above applications of procedural unconscionability in an arbitration set-
ting do not involve contracts permeated with "oppression" and "surprise,"' 194 or
contractual "terms [that] are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party
seeking to enforce [its] terms."'195 More accurately, they represent with exacting
clarity, the manipulation by California courts of well settled contractual law as a
means of expressing hostility to arbitration.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability concerns "the terms of the agreement and
whether those terms are 'so one-sided as to shock the conscience."",6 The collec-
tive conscience of courts applying California law is apparently quite delicate.
Indeed, the list of contract terms held "substantively unconscionable" by courts
applying California law in an arbitration setting is substantial. 197  Restrictions
relating to the types of remedies and claims available, 98 the availability of ap-
peals, 199 limits on the statute of limitations, 2° ° and the place and manner of arbitra-
188. Id.
189. O'Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 107 Cal. App. 4th 267, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
lack of "extrinsic evidence about the negotiations, if any, preceding the executions of the 1991 em-
ployment contract... does not preclude a finding of procedural unconscionability").
190. 109 Cal. App. 4th 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
191. Execution of the Form U-4 is required by California state and federal law as a means of register-
ing with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.210 (2004).
192. McManus, 109 Cal. App. at 91.
193. Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
194. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
195. Id.
196. Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis
added).
197. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064 (Cal. 2003); Harper v. Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th
1402, 1407 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
198. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 683 (Cal. 2000); Harper, 113
Cal. App. 4th at 1405; Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2003).
199. Little, 29 Cal. 4th at 1071-74 (holding provision allowing appellate review, at the request of
either party, of awards exceeding $50,000 substantively unconscionable); Fittante v. Palm Springs
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tion 20 1 have all been held substantively unconscionable based on the likelihood
that the term in question would favor the drafter of the contract. Under analogous
reasoning, arbitration agreements that bar class action suits, 20 2 require confidenti-
ality, 2°3 and give one party the power to terminate the agreement unilaterally (on
only one date per year with a thirty day notice)2 4 have been found substantively
unconscionable as well. For example, in Ting v. AT&T, a confidentiality require-
ment contained in an arbitration agreement was held unconscionable based on the
reasoning that "confidentiality provisions usually favor companies over individu-
als. ' 2
05
Terms requiring that filing fees20 6 or other arbitration costs be borne by a non-
drafting party (even if mutual), 20 7 and even in an indirect manner, are particularly
disfavored. For example, in Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, the court
stated that "a fee allocation scheme which requires the employee to split the arbi-
Motors, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 4th 708, 725-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Saika v. Gold, 49 Cal. App. 4th
1074, 1076-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to enforce appeal provision in agreement between doctor
and patient, which provided that either party could seek a trial de novo of any award over $25,000).
200. Compare Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding
that application of one year statute of limitations to claims to which a longer period would otherwise
apply favors the employer), Ingle, 328 F. 3d at 1175 (holding that one year statute of limitations con-
tained in agreement is substantively unconscionable), Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 118 Cal. App.
4th 107, 117-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that six month statute of limitations is substantively
unconscionable), with Soltani v. Western & Southern life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2001). In
Soltani, in a non-arbitration setting, the Ninth Circuit held that a contractual shortening of the statute of
limitations (to six months) is not substantively unconscionable. Id. California state decisions in a non-
arbitration setting have reached similar conclusions. See Han v. Mobil Oil Corp., 73 F.3d 872, 877
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that "California permits contracting parties to agree upon a shorter limitations
period for bringing an action than prescribed by statute, so long as the time allowed is reasonable");
West v. Henderson, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1578, 1581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding six month contractual
limitations provision in a lease not unconscionable, despite lack of mutuality); Capehart v. Heady, 206
Cal. App. 2d 386, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (concluding that three month limitation period in lease was
not unreasonable); Beeson v. Schloss, 183 Cal. 618, 624 (Cal. 1920) (finding six month limitation
reasonable in employment contract); Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 38
Cal. App. 4th 1532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
201. Bolter v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App. 4th 900, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that, in the context
of a franchise agreement, a requirement that an arbitration take place in franchisor's home state of Utah
is substantively unconscionable, but severing the lone offending provision from the agreement).
202. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that facially
mutual prohibition on arbitrator "consolidating claims of different persons" is substantively uncon-
scionable); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that mutual ban on class
actions is substantively unconscionable); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1094 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (mutual clause barring class actions held substantively unconscionable).
203. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151-52.
204. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1179 (holding unconscionable provision allowing employer to alter or termi-
nate the agreement on "December 31st of any year upon giving thirty calendar days notice").
205. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151.
206. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1177 (holding that a $75 filing fee is unconscionable because it is not the
"type of expense that the employee would be required to bear in federal court" and there is no waiver
available for indigent complainants); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that a $75 filing fee (the same fee at issue in Ingle) is unfairly one-sided even if there is
a fee waiver available); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2003)
(invalidating $125 filing fee payable to the National Arbitration Forum); Guttierez v. Autowest, Inc.,
114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 89-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that requiring a filing fee in a consumer
contract renders an agreement substantively unconscionable); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 118 Cal.
App. 4th 107, 115-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
207. O'Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 107 Cal. App. 4th 267, 282-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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trator's fees with the employer would alone render an arbitration agreement sub-
stantively unconscionable., 20 8 The court declared that "the only valid fee provi-
sion is one in which an employee is not required to bear any expense beyond what
would be required to bring the action in court.
'21
In O'Hare v. Municipal Resource Consultants, a California appellate court
went so far as to hold unconscionable a provision that incorporated the mutual and
well respected rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).21° The
AAA rules directed that the parties share the costs of arbitration unless agreed or
the law requires otherwise. 2  The fact that the employer in O'Hare later agreed
to pay all the costs was viewed by the court as irrelevant because this was merely
an unaccepted offer to modify the contract.212 The fact that the "law" did in fact
require the employer to shoulder all costs of the arbitration was also glossed over
by the court.2 3
Mutual limits on discovery in employment arbitration agreements have also
been held objectionable based on the assumption that an employer has superior
access to information and a decreased need for depositions. z4 Finally, as noted in
the preceding section above, strict "mutuality" is required under California law.21 5
208. Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 785.
209. Id. at 786.
210. 107 Cal. App. 4th at 279-80. The AAA is a well established (nearly eighty years old) not-for-
profit agency which administers dispute resolution services (i.e., arbitration and mediation). For more
information, see the AAA's website at www.adr.org. The AAA follows the Due Process Protocol,
which was the product of an ABA task force assembled to create standards for fair arbitration of em-
ployment disputes. Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Dispute Resolution, 1995 DLR 91 (BNA), May
11, 1995, at D-34. The ABA task force consisted of employer, union and employee representatives of
the ABA Labor & Employment Section, the American Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation
& Conciliation Service, American Civil Liberties Union, the National Employment Lawyers Associa-
tion, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the National Academy of Arbitrators.
211. O'Hare, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 279-80. A difficult problem in arbitration cases in California is
that what the law requires varies from day-to-day (and certainly year-to-year) and is constantly chang-
ing. Yet, despite this fact, courts have consistently applied their "new" arbitration decisions retroac-
tively, meaning that arbitration agreements that were often lawful when drafted are routinely struck
down as unconscionable at a later date. See Blake v. Ecker, 93 Cal. App. 4th 728, 733 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (determining that Armendariz applies retroactively); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115
Cal. App. 4th 638, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (determining that Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th
1064 (Cal. 2003) applies retroactively). These decisions appear to conflict with the general principle
that whether or not a contract is unconscionable is assessed as of the date the parties enter into the
contract. Am. Software Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
212. O'Hare, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 280. The logic of the court's conclusion is ostensibly grounded in
traditional contract law. The court reasoned that "such a willingness can be seen at most as an offer to
modify the contract; an offer that was never accepted. No existing rule of contract law permits a party
to resuscitate a legally defective contract merely by offering to change it." Id. (quoting Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 697 (Cal. 2000)); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal.
App. 4th 1519, 1535-36 (1997)). See also Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 4th 167, 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
213. O'Hare, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 279.
214. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 786-87 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
provision "appears to favor [employer] at the expense of its employees," while not invalidating provi-
sion placing limits on discovery); O'Hare, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 280-82.
215. In reality, courts have consistently required more that just mutual contractual language. For
example, in Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., the court held that an arbitration agreement which
carved out exceptions for claims relating to trade secrets, confidential information, and other intellec-
tual property, was substantively unconscionable despite the fact that it applied equally to both parties.
115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 665-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). See also Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 784-85 (holding
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Whether or not these contractual terms are "unfair" in some general sense,
they are a far cry from the overtly oppressive contracts traditionally policed by
courts under the doctrine of unconscionability-i.e., they do not "shock the con-
science. 216
3. The "Unwaivable" Protections
The California Supreme Court in Armendariz announced a set of "minimum
requirements" that must be satisfied as a prerequisite for the arbitration of certain
types of employment claims.217 The Armendariz requirements are: (1) no limita-
tion of available remedies; (2) adequate discovery; (3) a written arbitration deci-
sion setting forth, however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on
which the decision is based; and (4) all expenses unique to arbitration are to be
218borne by the employer. These requirements go beyond those mandated by the
FAA or the California Arbitration Act. These requirements have been held to
apply to the following claims: the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act,219 common law wrongful discharge claims, 220 and claims under California
Labor Code sections 230.8 and 970.221
The Armendariz Court justified these requirements based, in part, on the poli-
cies embodied in California Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits contracts
that exempt an individual of responsibility for a violation of law, and section
3513, which prohibits waivers of laws established for public reasons.222 The court
reasoned that a longstanding ground for refusing to enforce a contract term is that
it would force a party to forgo unwaivable public rights.223 The court further justi-
fied its position that arbitration may not be used to waive legal protections based
on dicta in the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,
which provided that a party arbitrating a statutory claim "does not forgo the sub-
stantive rights afforded by the statute [but] only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral... forum. '224 The California Supreme Court, in effect, concluded that the
that arbitration agreement which "specifically exclud[ed] claims for workers' compensation or unem-
ployment compensation benefits, injunctive and/or other equitable relief for intellectual property viola-
tions, unfair competition and/or the use and/or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential
information" was unfairly one-sided).
216. Marshall v. Pontiac is an example of a rare decision in which an employment arbitration agree-
ment was enforced as written. 287 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Cal. 2003).
217. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). In establishing the
minimum requirements, the Armendariz court relied on the D.C. Circuit's decision in Cole v. Bums
International Security, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Unlike the California courts, however, the
D.C. Circuit Court declined to extend the Cole requirements to apply to state common law claims that
implicate public policy, stating that there was "no basis" for extending Cole to non-statutory claims.
Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257 F.3d 821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
218. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682-90.
219. See generally id.
220. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1076-77 (Cal. 2003).
221. Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 4th 167, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that "the five
essentials of an arbitration agreement discussed in Armendariz apply to [the] claims under FEHA and
[the California] Labor Code").
222. Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669, 680-81.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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dicta in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. provided an additional ground for holding arbi-
tration agreements unenforceable-when arbitration compels a party to forgo their
substantive rights. 225 The minimum requirements, therefore, were designed by the
Armendariz court as a preventative measure to preclude any possibility that the
arbitration of a claim will undermine unwaivable rights.
By far the most controversial requirement imposed by the Armendariz court is
the cost provision, which requires an employer to bear all costs that are unique to
arbitration.2 6 This requirement stands in conflict with the United States Supreme
Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.227 The
Randolph decision declared that silence in an arbitration agreement with respect to
cost is wholly insufficient to render an agreement unenforceable because relying
on a mere "risk" of prohibitive costs to invalidate an arbitration agreement is a far
"too speculative" justification that would undermine the liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.
228
Notwithstanding Randolph, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its cost
provision in Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.229 The Little court concluded that the
FAA does not require state courts to adopt the same means as federal courts to
ensure that public rights are protected. Moreover, even if it did, its cost provision
was derived from state contract law, which the court contends is not preempted by
the FAA.2'° The California Supreme Court has failed to recognize that by pre-
suming that its requirements are necessary for the vindication of unwaivable rights
in an arbitral forum, it is exhibiting the hostility and suspicion to arbitration that
the FAA was enacted to prevent.
231
VI. CONCLUSION
There is much that can be said about the benefits and detriments of arbitra-
tion. That is not the intended subject of this article. Indeed, we do not pretend to
know what is "best" for society when it comes to arbitration of disputes. For pre-
sent purposes, we accept the FAA-and its interpretation by the United States
Supreme Court-at face value. In so doing, the conclusion that California
courts-and the Ninth Circuit-are imposing their own biases against arbitration
225. Id.
226. The risk that excessive costs in the arbitral forum may, in some circumstances, result in a de
facto waiver of the right to bring a claim was noted by California courts years before Armendariz. See
Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 977 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that "a contractor
may not use [an arbitration] provision in a contract such as this to effectively deny such home owner
an opportunity to press a damage claim against him").
227. 531 U.S. 79, 80-81 (2000).
228. Id.
229. 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1082-85 (Cal. 2003).
230. Id. Justice Baxter argued that the court should overrule the Armendariz per se rule regarding
arbitration costs and adopt the fact based test from Randolph. Id. at 1086-89 (Baxter, J., concurring
and dissenting) (Chin, J. and Brown, J., joined). Justice Brown in the dissenting portion of his separate
opinion, noted that "this court appears to be 'chipping away at' United States Supreme Court prece-
dents broadly construing the scope of the FAA 'by indirection' despite the high court's admonition
against doing so ..... Id. at 1095. The court also urged "the high court to clarify once and for all
whether our approach to arbitration law comports with its precedents." Id.
231. The Supreme Court itself has cautioned against these types of sweeping generalizations. Shear-
son/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
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is inescapable. Whether that bias is overt or cloaked in the guise of a generally
applicable contract rule is, from a legal perspective, irrelevant. In either case, it is
precisely the bias the FAA was enacted to overcome and it is preempted by the
FAA. Of course, the United States Supreme Court will have the last word on this
issue, but a regard for the complexity of these issues and the fact that, at some
point, that review will come, would be a prudent course of action for the lower
courts.
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